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A CONCEPTUALISTIC TANGLE AND THE
ONE- OR TWO-MAN CORPORATION
E. R. LATTY*
The judicial opinions in the Park Terrace litigation' have generated
so much concern among lawyers and businessmen in North Carolina
that they merit a special commentary. The case could and should have
been disposed of quite easily on the ground that a release of a corporate
cause of action by the sole stockholder precludes the corporation from
enforcing that cause of action, at least in absence of special circumstances
not present in this case. Instead, in its twisting course which finally
managed to leave the way open to preclude the corporation's recovery,
the North Carolina Supreme" Court has shaken the very foundation of
the one-man corporation (including wholly owned subsidiaries of a
parent corporation) and the two-man corporation. It is instructive to
see how this came about.
The defendant, Park Builders, had constructed an apartment housing
project for the plaintiff corporation under a contract with that corporation. Subsequently, the four persons owning all the corporation's common stock sold all their stock to McLean. Some of the sellers also owned
shares in the defendant, Park Builders, for which reason the stock purchase agreement between the purchaser and three of the sellers contained
a provision substantially to the effect that: McLean accepts and has by
this contract accepted the real estate and improvements in the property
owned by the corporation in their present condition and agrees that no
claim shall be made againt Park Builders (or the sellers of the stock)
because of improper workmanship or use of defective materials. Eighteen months after McLean had so acquired all the common stock, and
while he still held it, the corporation brought an action against Park
Builder's surety (to which action Park Builders was made a defendant)
to recover damages for alleged improper workmanship and use of defective material. Park Builders in its answer, properly viewing itself
as third party beneficiary under the above contract of release, pleaded
sole stockholder McLean's above agreement as a defense and moved to
make McLean a party defendant.
One theory on which the pleaded agreement could be a defense is that
even if viewed as the agreement of McLean himself and not as an agreement made for the corporation, still it was enough to preclude the cor* Professor of Law, Duke University.

1 Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d 677
(1955) ; on rehearing, 243 N. C. 595, 91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956).
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poration's suit. The Court, it is submitted, should have sustained this
defense on this theory, as well as on other theories discussed later.
In refusing to do so in the first hearing it seems (although the Court
does not spell this out) that the Court overemphasized the sanctity of
the corporate entity-the concept of the corporation as a separate entity
distinct from the shareholders. Now, the separate entity concept should
be viewed only as a shorthand formula for summarizing the attributes
of a corporation for a fairly long list of legal issues in the solution of
which the corporation is to be viewed as if it were a person distinct from
the shareholders. (The list would include such important issues as
liability for corporate debts.) It should not be used as the dogmatic
premise from which, by sheer logic, one drives to the seemingly inescapable conclusion that, whatever be the issue, the corporation is something
completely separate and apart from the shareholders, let the chips fall
where they may.
In this areas of corporate entity doctrine the courts find readily available completely antithetical formulae. On the one hand it is stated time
and again in judicial opinions that a corporation is ordinarily an entity
distinct from the shareholders; on the other hand, judicial statements
abound to the effect that the corporate entity will be disregarded when
justice so requires. One is reminded of competing proverbs: absence
makes the heart grow fonder; out of sight is out of mind. The task of
choosing which of these competing entity rules to apply is a most delicate
operation. The Park Terrace case was one where the sole stockholder
2
was exercising his dominant control over his wholly owned corporation
to have it bring suit on a cause of action upon which he had agreed "no
claim" would be made and under which, if corporate recovery were
allowed, the recovery would benefit the very person who had agreed to
release the claim. This is the perfect case for disregarding the corporate
entity or, if you prefer, for lifting the cloak of corporate entity and taking
a peek to see who is there underneath, getting the benefits of the corporate action. Certainly there is no dearth of decisions and formulae
for disregarding the corporate entity in a "proper case." 3 Putting aside
any question of fraud by the stock sellers in the instance case, it would
be about as shocking to let the sole stockholder profit by his breach of
contract here as to see the beneficiary of a life insurance policy get the
2

The preferred stock in the instant case, all held by the FHA,was only nominal

in amount and existed solely to give FHA voting control in the event of the default
under the mortgage on the housing project.
'In FLETCHER, CoapoRAOTos (perm. ed. 1931) in the sections to the effect that
a corporation ordinarily is viewed as a separate entity, literally hundreds of cases
are cited, true. See citations to § 25 et seq., in cum. supp. 1955. But an equally
impressive number of cases are also cited under §§ 41 and 42, especially in cum.
supp. 1955, for disregarding the corporate entity "when necessary to the justice of
the case."
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proceeds when he murders the insured. For analogy, consider what
should be the result where A buys from B all the stock of a corporation,
after full investigation of its assets and business, 4 and then, having paid
the price upon in the arm's length bargain, has the corporation bring an
action against B to recover for, say, B's having sometime in pre-sale days
taken "corporate opportunities" for himself. In such a case even the
corporation itself would probably be barred from recovering ;5 a fortiori
would the corporation be barred, it is submitted, if purchaser A had expressly agreed with seller B that no claim would be made against B
arising out of B's former management of the corporation.
To make its "entity treatment" still more confusing, the Supreme
Court in the original Park Terrace hearing, after having treated the corporation as a separate entity, added at the very end of the majority
opinion the ominous remark: "Query: Since McLean has now acquired
all the stock of plaintiff, is it now a corporation? The question is not
presented by the record." But since the record did show that McLean
was the sole stockholder (except for preferred stockholder, whose holdings here could be disregarded), if that feature makes a corporation
not a corporation (about which more later) why did not this clearly
-he question whether there was now no corporation and whether,
pre.
accoraimgly, the sole stockholder was the true plaintiff (under another
name) and hence barred from enforcing a claim which he had released?
A further theory upon which a defense arising out of the sole stockholder's release might be based is that the release was not simply the
personal release of the sole stockholder but was a corporate act, in which
the sole stockholder either was empowered automatically to act for the
corporation by virtue of his acquisition of all of the shares (plus also
getting the contemporaneous written resignation of all of the officers
and directors) or had for other reasons become authorized to act for the
corporation. For this line of reasoning it could even be conceded that
the corporation is viewed as a separated entity.. It is submitted that here
again the court took too narrow a view in finding that this was not a
corporate act. The Court opined that, for one thing, the sole stockholder,
in his purchase agreement, did not purport to act for the corporation.
What does a sole stockholder have to do to purport to act for the corporation? Does he have to state expressly that he is so acting? When
this sole stockholder, with all the corporate control that sole ownership
carried with it, agreed that "no claim" would be made against Park
' On stock purchaser McLean's inspection of the properties here involved, see

companion case, Lester v. McLean, 242 N. C. 390, 87 S. E. 2d 886 (1955).
See Capital Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 302 N. Y. 734, 98 N. E. 2d 704
(1951), affg 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (1st Dept. 1950). See also
Home Fire Ins. Co., v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 11024 (1903), quite properly
cited by Bobbitt, J. dissenting in the Park Terrace case, supra note 1, on original
hearing.
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Builders, then, since the only one who might have any claim was the
corporation, cannot the part of the agreement that relates to the "no
claim" aspect be viewed as being made on behalf of the corporation, even
though the main subject matter of the contract was one to which the corporation was not a signatory party? One must bear in mind that the sole
stockholder is often likely to overlook formalities incident to corporate
action as mere red tape; in the resulting failure to identify clearly the
capacity in which the sole shareholder acts the court has the opportunity
to put that interpretation upon the actor's capacity which most comports
with the just solution.
The Court, instead, seemed to reason that McLean's release did not
bind the corporation because he was not authorihed to act for it. At the
time he signed the contract, said the Court in the first decision, McLean
was not a stockholder, director or officer. But, for one thing, one does
not have to be actually registered on the books to be a stockholder.
More important, the Court's reasoning overlooks that the very contract
by which he became the controlling stockholder was the contract in which
he agreed that no claim would be made against Park Builders and that
at the time of the contract all the shareholders involved in the sale of
stock (whether you view the sellers as still the shareholders or the buyer
as now the shareholder) intended that all claims against Park Builders
would be released by the sale of all the shares. Finally, if it be Gonceded
that, despite the Court's view above discussed, McLean intended to act
for the corporation but that he then was not yet the sole stockholder and
hence without authority, his immediate acquisition of the status of sole
stockholder, combined with corporate passivity (with, obviously, "corporate" knowledge of the act), amounted to ratification by the corporation, if the crucial point be granted that the act of a sole stockholder can
"bind" the corporation without further corporate formalities.0 Here,
again, the Court took a position that is questionable. It seemed to view
the problem as one to be solved by resort to the hornbook black letter
rule that corporate action by shareholders and directors requires them to
act as a body, in regular meeting. But that is only the rule ordinarily-a
rule for the protection of stockholders and accordingly to be applied
where some or all of the co-owners of the corporation would be deprived
of the benefits of the appropriate corporate organs of discussion. The
case of Duke v. Markham,7 cited by the Court, is a perfect example of
the ordinary application of the orthodox rule: the alleged assent to a
corporate mortgage by a number of shareholders holding a majority of
6 That the act of the sole stockholder can bind the corporation, see Fuller, The
Incorporated Individual; A Study of the One Man Company, 51 Hv.
L. REV.
1373, 1387-89 (1938) ; LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936)

70-72.

1105 N. C.131, 10 S.E. 1017 (1890).
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the stock was obtained by an officer who contacted the stockholders separately, and not all of them at that. The rule obviously has no application
where there are only two stockholders, one of whom gets the consent of
the other; a fortiori where there is only one stockholder. 8 In such a
close corporation, the basic reason for the general rule fails. Cessante
ratione, cessat lex. In corporation law, one must always re-examine the
validity with respect to close corporations of those rules that grew up
against the background of the publicly held corporation.
The upshot of the original Park Terrace hearing in the Supreme
Court was, accordingly, that those paragraphs in the defendant's answer
based on the sole-stockholder's release of the defendant were stricken
from the pleading and that the sole stockholder was held not to be a
necessary party defendant.
On rehearing, the majority of the Court managed to work out a
technique that had the effect of making the sole stockholder's release preclude recovery by his corporation. The technique was to hold that the
sole stockholder was a necessary party plaintiff. (The Court's power,
it said, over lower court orders, judgment and decrees was adequate,
in order to promote justice in a proper case, to make the stockholder a
plaintiff even though the motion had been to make him a defendant. It
is interesting to note that "proper cases" and "promotion of justice"
are also the very factors that empower courts to disregard the corporate
entity.) This technique of making the sole stockholder a necessary party
plaintiff, will cause his release to preclude recovery whatever he does:
if he files a pleading the defendant's plea of release will succeed; and if
he files no pleadings, then said the court, the "defendants may file an
amended answer alleging the facts which make McLean the real-and a
necessary-party plaintiff and plead their contract with him"' 9 -which
will presumably be a good defense to the action.
Why was he a necessary party plaintiff? The reason (said the Court)
is that he was "the real party in interest" ;1o and the reason that he was
the real party in interest (and here comes the bombshell which has
caused consternation in close corporation circles in this state) is, the
Court opined, that a one-man corporation is not within the statutory
scheme of things for corporations as gathered from the framework of
the North Carolina corporation law. Specifically, the Court said:
"It requires three or more persons to obtain a certificate of
incorporation, G. S. § 55-2, and the certificate of incorporation
must be signed by a majority of the applicants. If one dies before
S See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 19'46) 125-27, 390-91.
' Park Terrace v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 243 N. C. 595, 599, 91 S. E. 2d 584,
588 1 (1956).
°Id. at 597, 91 S. E. at 586.
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the organization of the corporation, some other person must be
designated in his place and stead. G. S. § 55-7. The corporation
must have at least three directors who manage the affairs of the
corporation, G. S. § 55-48, and three officers, provided any two
offices may be held by one person. So there must be at least two
officers. G. S. § 55-49. Real estate of the corporation may be
conveyed by its president and two stockholders or by the president, attested by the secretary. G. S. 55-40. Three stockholders
may call a meeting of the corporation, G. S.§55-6, and a majority
of stockholders may dissolve the corporation, G. S. § 55-121.
"Thus the concept that a corporation is a combination of three
or more persons who may operate as a legal entity when chartered
so to do threads its way through the cited and practically every
other section of our law on corporations. General Statutes, Ch.
55. No lesser number will suffice.""
The Court then posed this question: "When one person acquires all
the stock of a corporation, what then is the status of the corporation and
the property held in its name?
To which the Court then made the following answer:
"We are of the opinion and so hold that the corporation becomes dormant or inactive and exists only for the purpose of holding legal title of the property for the use and benefit of the single
stockholder who becomes seized of the beneficial title to the property. Not possessing the managerial agencies-stockholders,
directors, or officers,-contemplated by statute, it can no longer
act as a corporation. Its decisions are the decisions of the single
'
stockholder, and its action is his action. "lla
No previous judicial decisions of the Court would have led one to
anticipate this rationale. One ventures that nowhere in American decisions of the 20th century has a court for the first time -cast so dark a
cloud on a form of business organization so commonly accepted, so entrenched in the business mores of the business world, as the one-man
and two-man corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary of a parent
corporation. Literally thousands of such corporations exist in this
state, 12 as well as in other states.
True, the inner structure of the North Carolina corporation law
reveals that it was framed with the publicly held corporation primarily
in mind. That law was enacted over 50 years ago, close to the turn of
Il Id. at 597, 91 S. E. 2d at 586.
21 Ibid.
'2 One Durham, North Carolina, lawyer alone tells me he has nearly 100 one-man
or two-man corporations as clients.
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the century. In that day, the close corporation had not yet become the
familiar phenomenon that it now is. Since then, in this state as well as
over the country generally, the historical idea of the corporation as a
legally personified body of numerous subscribers to its public offering
of stock has undergone sharp evolution, as have many other business
practices and their legal bases. We have come to look upon corporation
laws as affording a machinery which, although originally devised for
numerous associates is, after all, adaptable also for the few, and to view
requirements of three incorporators, three directors, etc., as mere formalities-almost legal idiosyncrasies-which are to be complied with, as are
other formalities in the law, but which carry no implication of a mandatory public policy, and by no means carrying an implication of requiring
three stockholders at all times. There is no magic in numbers and there
is no public policy which says that three men may limit their liability
and acquire a legal personality different (for some purposes) from their
individual personality, but that one man or two men cannot. For example, in so far as limited liability is concerned, as Lord Herschell said
in a famous English case: "How does it concern the creditor whether
the capital of the company is owned by seven persons . . . or almost

entirely owned by one person."' 3 (He could well have left out even the
word "almost.") If one wants to argue that this is a contention that
should be addressed to the legislature, the argument assumes that the
present corporation law contains a clear command against less-thanthree-man corporations.

It is submitted that the law is not that rigid.

True, it contemplates a structure more appropriate to representative
form of government (three directors, etc.) than to one-man and two-man
corporations, but even the prescribed structure is not impossible for the
latter. It is to be noted that in 1949 the Legislature abolished the requirement that directors must be shareholders; this can be taken as some
indication of legislative acceptance of less than three stockholders. Other
states also have the same inner structure as does the North Carolina
corporation law, yet nowhere else in this century is so strong a judicial
denunciation of such corporations to be found. 1 4 It is fair to say that
"See Salomon v. Salomon [1897] A. C. 22, 44-45.

" One finds Kentucky cases in the 20th century that still talk about "suspension"
of the corporation when all the stock is acquired by one person. Russell Lumber &
Supply Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 262 Ky. 388, 90 S. W. 2d 372 (1936) ; Hawley Coal
Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67, S.W. 2d 703 (1934). But in Kentucky this is merely
a survival of a rationale announced in the 19th century. Moreover, "the suspension" rationale generally appears as a make-weight and is referred to only in passing, as it were, in cases where the court reaches the decision without resting primarily on that reasoning.
What one is more apt to find in judicial language now-a-days in the case of the
one-man corporation is not "suspension" or "dormancy" talk but unguarded overstatement, e.g., Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636 (La. App. 1936), to the effect
that the one-man stockholder "may not use the screen of corporate entity to
absolve him from responsibility." (All that this meant was that the corpora-
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no disturbance comparable to that produced by the Park Terrace rehearing has been caused in close corporation circles by a judicial decision since the English Court of Appeals in 1895 held that Mr. Salomon
was obligated to pay the creditors of his insolvent corporation, Salomon
& Co., because although there were six other shareholders who each had
a share (viz., his wife, daughter and four sons), apparently making up
the required seven, the real beneficial owner of all the outstanding shares
was really one person, a situation which (said that court) the Companies
Act scheme of things did not contemplate. 15 The great shock 16 that this
decision was to English business no doubt was a factor in its categorical
reversal by the House of Lords.'1
There is a further difficulty in the Park Terrace rehearing: in order
to "come out right" the Court was forced to make still another false turn.
After stating that the corportion became "dormant" for reasons stated in
the excerpt previously quoted, the Court went on to say that the sole
stockholder "could not later, and cannot now, evade the consequences of
his act merely by transferring some of the stock to third parties so as to
comply with the statute." If it be granted that sole stockholder McLean's
release of the defendant should have precluded the corporation from
recovery (for reasons hereinbefore stated), then the corporation would
of course be barred from recovery even if at the time of bringing the
action it has acquired three or more stockholders, at least unless they are
bona fide purchasers of shares who would be unjustly aggrieved if their
corporation were to be deprived of this asset-which is doubtful. But,
on the "party plaintiff" rationale, if the corporation is not dormant at
the time the motion is made to make the shareholder a party, on the
tion's sale of its business and good will precludes the sole stockholder from continuing the same line of business at the same location and making frequent use of
the old name. Even this proper disregard of the corporate entity does not mean
that the sole stockholder loses limited liability.)
" Broderip v. Solomon [1895] 2 Ch. Div. 323.
1" Here are some of the comments that the Court of Appeals decision evoked in
contemporary literature:
"Opposed to the settled practice of recent years and ... a source of danger to
the multitude of private companies which have been established . . ." 41 SoL. J. 61
(1896).
"Shaken the stability of half of the private companies in existence." 31 L. J.
631 (1896).
"A novel and startling doctrine." Sweet, The Bona Fide Incorporator'sCase,
7 JuR. R v. 314, 323 (1895).
"The giant growth of joint stock enterprise is one of the marvels of our age.
Whatever may be said of it, it has conferred very great benefits on the community.
It has given enormous impulse to trade; it has unlocked by the magic key of
limited liability vast sums for useful industrial undertakings. . . . Let us beware
lest in gathering the tares we root up the wheat also." Manson, One Manl Companies, 11 L. Qu. REv. 185, 188 (1895).
" Salomon v. Salomon [1897] A. C. 22. In turn, the House of Lords went too
far the other way in permitting sole stockholder Salomon to stand as a £20,000
secured creditor of his corporation which had an equity capital of only £10,000. It
is easy in these corporation cases to aim either too high or too low.
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hypothesis that he has theretofore transferred a share to each of two
other persons so that the coporation now has three stockholders, then
the real-party-in-interest status of the now-dominant-but-not-sole stockholder would seem to have disappeared. Obviously, the Court cannot
mean that a corporation once dormant for lack of three shareholders
cannot later be revived by acquiring the requisite number.
All in all, it would be much better just to forget about this "dormancy" theory of one-man corporations.
One cannot help wondering whether a Pandora's box has now been
opened by this "dormancy" rationale, and a mass of potential troubles
let loose. Will sole stockholders lose limited liability? Will the federal
income tax authorities question, or even reopen, tax solutions which so
often involve one-man or two-man corporations? Will the income of
the sole stockholder now include that of the corporation, all at individual
rates? Can the Court's rationale be circumvented by one real stockholder and two dummies who appear on the books as stockholders but
whose stock certificate, blank endorsed, is held by the real stockholder?
(If not, are we wisely discouraging one source of venture capital?) In
all corporate litigation, must the sole stockholder (or the two if only
two) be made a party for being the "real party in interest"? Must he
sign the deeds conveying corporate property? (Will the title insurance
companies now insist on this, and make investigation into the actual as
well as registered holding of shares?) What about past deeds executed
by corporations in the "normal" way? (Will title insurance companies
and institutional lenders now refuse to approve titles under such past
deeds?) Granted that the next General Assembly will react with vigor
to the doctrine announced in the Park Terrace litigation (which can be
predicted with confidence, whatever else the 1957 Legislature may do
on the general subject of corporation law revision), what about past
transactions of one-man and two-man corporations? Will even the most
curative of curative statutes really cure?
The best hope, in addition to legislation, is that the Court will whittle
away Park Terrace to where there is nothing left of it. If it is willing
to close its eyes just a bit, the way is open-the Court itself left it open.
The Court said of the corporation in Park Terrace: "Not possessing the
managerial agencies-stockholders, directors, or officers,-contemplated
by statute, it can no longer act as a corporation."18 Now, even one-man
corporations (and a fortiori two-man ones) will normally have directors
and officers, even if they are only old hold-overs. Accordingly, the Court
can well say of the next case that comes along: this case is distinguishable; in the case before us it appears that the corporation had officers and
"S
Park Terrace v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 243 N. C. 595, 597, 91 S. E. 2d 584,
586 (1956).
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director and hence it did not lack the essential managerial agencies during
the periods pertinent to the litigation; hence, although some of the language in the Park Terrace case taken literally might indicate the contrary, the existence of the corporation now bef6re us has not been effectively impaired.
True, although the opinion does not so indicate, one suspects that the
requisite directors and officers existed even in the Park Terrace case, and
that's why we say the Court may have to close an eye for a bit. This
feat should not be difficult for a court which displayed the ingenuity to
make the Park Terrace sole stockholder a necessary party plaintiff so as
to make the case before.
Of course, if the significafice of a judicial decision lies only in what
is actually held, and not in the announced reasoning that accompanies
the holding, there is nothing to get excited about over the Park Terrace
case. One view of what the court held is this: where the sole stockholder, even though not acting "authorizedly for" the corporation, gives
a release on a cause of action which his corporation has against a third
party, that release (in the absence of special circumstances) will be a
defense even against the corporation itself; and one device by which that
defense is made effective is to require the said stockholder to be a party
plaintiff in any suit by the corporation to enforce that cause of action.
But even if this be the proper theory of the "authority" of judicial decisions under our common law system of stare decisis, we must not overlook the fact that the power of the written word in a judicial decision
often overshadows the nub of the decision itself.

